How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the
Major Airlines by Goolsbee, Austan - University of Chicago & Syverson, Chad - University of Chicago
 
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #04-04 
 
October 2004 
 
How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines 
 
Austan Goolsbee and Chad Syverson 
 
University of Chicago 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
 
 
 
 
How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry on Their Networks? 
Evidence from the Major Airlines* 
 
 
Austan Goolsbee 
University of Chicago, GSB 
American Bar Foundation and NBER 
goolsbee@gsb.uchicago.edu 
and
Chad Syverson 
University of Chicago 
and NBER 
syverson@uchicago.edu 
 
Original Draft: May 2004 
Current Draft: December 2004 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors, as 
distinguished from their response to competitors’ actual entry.  It uses a case study from the 
passenger airline industry—specifically, the evolution of Southwest Airlines’ route network—to 
identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly.  When Southwest 
begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself, this dramatically 
raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future.  We examine the pricing of 
the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events.  We find that 
incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by Southwest’s entry into their routes.  This 
is true even after controlling in several ways for airport-specific operating costs.  The response of 
incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself, and not to routes out of nearby 
competitor airports where Southwest does not operate (e.g., fares drop on routes from Chicago 
Midway but not Chicago O’Hare).  The largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that 
were concentrated beforehand.  Incumbents do experience short-run increases in their passenger 
loads concurrent with these fare cuts.  This is consistent with theories implying incumbents will 
try to generate some longer-term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new 
competitor.  We examine evidence relating this demand-building motive to frequent flyer 
programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion.  There is only weak evidence that 
incumbents increase capacity on the routes. 
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I. Introduction 
        In this paper we examine how incumbents respond to the threat of entry by a competitor.  
Though this topic has been the object of considerable theoretical and policy debate, it has 
received little empirical attention, mainly due to the problems of identifying when the threat of 
entry rises (as contrasted with when entry occurs, which is directly observable). 
        We will examine this issue in the passenger airline industry.  In this circumstance, we are 
able to identify discrete shifts in the threat of entry.  We do this by using the expansion patterns 
the most famous potential competitor in the industry, Southwest Airlines, to identify 
circumstances where the threat of Southwest entering a specific route rises significantly.1  
Specifically, we look at situations where Southwest begins operating in the second endpoint 
airport of a route (having already been operating out of the first endpoint), but before it starts 
flying the route itself.  We investigate how incumbents’ prices respond to such threats.  Since 
major incumbent carriers have extensive route networks (offering many possible entry episodes) 
and the government reports extensive fare data on these routes, we have considerable empirical 
variation with which to identify any effects. 
 As an example of our empirical strategy, consider the recent entry of Southwest airlines 
into the Philadelphia airport (this specific case is not in our data because it occurred so recently, 
but it illustrates the episodes we study).  On May 9, 2004, Southwest began operations in the 
Philadelphia airport (PHL) with nonstop flights to six other cities in its network, and one-stop 
service to several others.  One route Southwest did not offer service when they entered the 
Philadelphia market was Philadelphia-Jacksonville, Florida (JAX).  Jacksonville is a Southwest 
airport.  Southwest does fly between JAX and other airports, just not PHL-JAX.  Once 
Southwest is operating out of both end points on a route—here both JAX and PHL—the 
probability that they will soon start flying the route between those two airports goes up 
dramatically.  Indeed, operating in both end points raises the probability of entering the route by 
nearly a factor of 60 in the data presented in a later section.  With that increase in probability, we 
can then look at, say, US Airways’ and United Airlines’ (the incumbents) fares on the JAX-PHL 
route once Southwest threatens entry but has yet to actually start flying. 
 The paper builds on two literatures.  Empirically, it is obviously connected to the 
                                                 
1 Southwest’s network has been expanding rapidly for some time and the impact of their actual entry on prices in a 
market is well known (see, for example, Morrison, 2001). 
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extensive literature on airline competition, especially the work relating to airport presence and 
the sources of airport market power.2  These papers, however, have looked, almost exclusively, 
at the impact of actual actions rather than pre-emptive actions.  Our empirical strategy is perhaps 
closest to Ellison and Ellison’s (2000) study of incumbent drug makers’ actions in the period just 
preceding expiration of their patents. 
 The paper’s second connection is to the considerable body of theoretical work on 
strategic entry deterrence, particularly those models that offer rationale for incumbents initiating 
competitive actions before entry actually occurs.  These include, for example, Dixit’s (1979) 
capacity commitment motivation, the strategic learning-by-doing of Spence (1981), cost-
signaling as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982), the long-term contracting environment of Aghion 
and Bolton (1987), and switching costs as in Klemperer (1987) and Farrell and Klemperer 
(2004).  These rationale were forwarded as responses to the theoretical results implying that 
preemptive incumbent actions are irrational, either because they are not subgame perfect (in the 
spirit of Selten’s (1978) chain-store paradox), or because costly competitive actions should be 
delayed until entry actually occurs.  These papers counter the traditional argument that firms 
should act only when they actually face competition.  Our empirical work tests between the two 
views. 
The results show that incumbents do respond to the threat of entry, quite separately from 
their responses to actual entry.  Incumbents drop average fares substantially when Southwest 
threatens a route but before Southwest actually enters the route.  This is true even when we 
compare the fare changes on threatened routes to those on incumbents’ other routes out of the 
same airports, indicating that shifts in airport-specific operating cost are not creating spurious 
results.  As expected, the lower prices increase in the number of passengers flying the 
incumbents prior to entry.  We also find, interestingly, that while incumbents cut fares on the 
threatened route, they do not cut prices on routes to nearby airports in the same market (e.g., 
Chicago-O'Hare when Southwest threatens a Chicago-Midway route).  Further, fare cuts are 
considerably larger on routes that were concentrated before Southwest’s threat.  There is only 
weak evidence that airlines expand flight or seat capacity in response to the threat of entry; 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Reiss and Spiller (1989), Hurdle et al. (1989), Borenstein (1989, 1991, 1992), Berry (1990, 
1992), Brueckner et al. (1992), Evans and Kessides (1993), Whinston and Collins (1992), Borenstein and Rose 
(1994), Hendricks et al. (1997), and the more recent work of Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2001) or Mayer 
and Sinai (2004). 
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instead, this additional demand is taken up mostly through higher load factors.  Finally, we find 
suggestive evidence consistent with airlines trying to increase customer loyalty through 
mechanisms like frequent flyer programs.  The fare drops are greatest for incumbents’ high-fare-
paying customers and on routes with more  business travelers.   
 
II. Data 
 Because we are primarily concerned with fares, we use the U.S. Department of 
Transportation’s DB1A files from 1993 to 2002 to build the core of our sample.  These data 
provide a 10% sample of all domestic tickets used in each quarter, which we use to compute the 
average, standard deviation, and specific quantiles of logged ticket prices within each route-
carrier-quarter combination (unfortunately the data do not report any specific travel dates within 
the quarter).3  Following the previous literature, we define a route by its two endpoint airports 
alone, not any intermediate stops along the way.  We look at so-called “direct flights” 
(predominantly nonstop flights but technically including itineraries where the passenger stops 
but does not change planes).  We restrict our sample to routes between airports that Southwest 
ever flies any flights to in our sample.  This includes 838 routes between 61 different airports.   
 The “threatened” entry events we study are identified from the observed expansion 
patterns of Southwest Airlines.  Southwest grew tremendously throughout our sample period.  Its 
revenues grew from $2.3 billion to $5.5 billion, passenger-miles from 18.8 to 45.4 billion, and it 
added service to 21 new airports between the end of 1993 and the start of 2003.4  Every time 
Southwest begins service in a new airport, it raises the threat that Southwest will enter routes 
connecting that airport with other airports in its network.  We illustrate this in Figure 1.  
Southwest enters Philadelphia and begins flights from there to Tampa in the second quarter of 
2004.  Southwest is already flying out of Jacksonville (and has been since 1997) to cities in its 
network other than Philadelphia.  Now, though, the entry into Philadelphia makes Southwest 
highly likely to start flying Philadelphia-Jacksonville in the near future.5 
                                                 
3 We use  Severin Borenstein’s cleaned files , which are aggregated up to the route-carrier-quarter level, since this is 
the level of our analysis rather than the ticket.  We use the original source files to compute the fare quantiles since 
that information is not included in the Borenstein files.  
4 Southwest exited one airport, San Francisco International (SFO), in 2001.  It had operated there since before 1993. 
5 Indeed, Southwest eventually did enter the PHL-JAX route in the fourth quarter of 2004.  Our empirical 
specification captures the separate impacts of both such threatened-entry and actual-entry events. 
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 The importance of airport presence is well known in the industry as an indicator of future 
entry.6  In Table 1 we present a simple probit regression of whether Southwest starts flying a 
route in a given quarter to verify the impact of having presence in both end points on the threat 
of entry.  This is meant only for descriptive purposes, not as an actual model of entry.  It does not 
include extensive controls, just the number of endpoints Southwest is already operating at the 
beginning of the quarter and time dummies for every quarter in the sample.  The results show 
that having a presence in one airport significantly raises the probability of entry (the baseline 
probability is close to zero) to a small positive number.  Having a presence in both airports, 
though, raises it by a factor just under 60—to almost 17 percent per quarter.  The existing 
network of the airline therefore serves as a superb predictor of entry in any empirical model.7 
 At any given point in time, we take that existing network as given and look at 
incumbents’ fares on a route once it becomes clear that Southwest is looming as a competitor.  
To determine these price responses, we capture threatened entry effects using dummies in the 
quarters surrounding Southwest’s establishment of operations in both endpoint airports (but 
without flying the route) and control for actual entry effects with dummies in quarters during and 
after the quarter Southwest starts flying the route.  We restrict our attention to the behavior of the 
major carriers: American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and US Airways. 
 We observe hundreds of routes threatened with entry over the period.  In most of these 
cases, Southwest eventually starts flying the route at a later date in our sample; in others, 
Southwest establishes a presence in both airports but had not yet begun flying the route by the 
end of our observation period (up to three years after).  We exclude any route from our sample 
where either Southwest never establishes an airport presence in both airports or where Southwest 
establishes the presence simultaneously with actually flying the route.  In those latter cases we 
have no period with which to identify a heightened threat of entry separately from actual entry.  
For each route in our sample we look at a six year window surrounding the quarter in which 
Southwest establishes a presence in both endpoints (again, without actually flying the route).  We 
                                                 
6 See Berry (1994) for empirical work on the subject or Bailey (1981) for a narrative discussion of a particular 
episode where this idea was applied in antitrust policy toward the industry. 
7 Below we consider a broader definition of entry that allows for the possibility that Southwest can de facto enter a 
route, even if it does not offer a direct flight, if it is carrying enough passengers between a route’s endpoint cities 
through connecting airports.  If this definition is used instead in the entry probit, the implied probabilities of entry 
are of course higher, but the probability ratio between entry conditional on being in both endpoints to that when 
Southwest is in only one endpoint is still roughly 60. 
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have checked and found our results robust to longer event windows. 
 We define Southwest's actual entry as occurring when it establishes direct service (i.e., 
flights without a change of plane) between the two airports.  This definition of entry is easiest to 
understand, but we will also show that the results are not sensitive to defining Southwest’s entry 
as including cases where they start either direct or indirect service (involving a stop and a plane 
change) on the route.8 
In all, we observe Southwest threatening entry into 838 routes over the sample period.9  
We focus on the behavior of major airline incumbents in the 25 quarters surrounding the initial 
threat (that is, the three years before and the quarter that Southwest starts operating in the second 
endpoint of the route, as well as the three years after).  This yields almost 19,000 route-carrier-
quarter observations of average logged fares and passenger counts for major airlines’ direct 
flights on threatened routes.  Summary statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2.  
  
III. Hypotheses and Empirical Specifications 
 Our baseline model measures the impact of Southwest establishing a presence in both 
endpoints of a route by looking at the periods before, during, and after this event, while 
controlling for other influences.  The basic specification, with some slight abuse of summation 
notation as explained below, is as follows: 
0
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where yri,t is the outcome of interest (e.g., mean logged fares or logged total passengers) for 
incumbent carrier i flying route r in quarter t.  
0,
_ _ _ r tSW in both airports τ+  are time dummies 
surrounding the period when Southwest establishes a presence in both endpoints of a route but 
before they have actually started flying the route.  ,_ _ er tSW flying route τ+  are time dummies 
starting with the period Southwest actually starts flying on the route.  Each dummy is mutually 
exclusive of the others, so the implied effects on the dependent variable given by their 
coefficients are not additive.  The γri and µt are fixed effects for carrier-route and time.  Some 
                                                 
8 Note that just because Southwest flies routes that could be connected does not mean that they operate a route 
indirectly.  There are many routes where Southwest operates in both airports but they will not sell a single itinerary 
between the two and there are no tickets for the route in our sample. 
9 By the final quarter of 2002 (the end of our observation period), Southwest had actually entered about 500 of these 
routes. 
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specifications will also include a set of controls Xri,t. 
In all regressions, we weight observations by the number of passengers flying the route-
carrier in the quarter, so larger incumbent routes have a greater impact on the measured average 
response than do smaller routes.  We also cluster standard errors at the route level to account for 
any correlation in unobservables across carriers or time periods within routes. 
The covariates of interest for determining threatened entry’s impact on incumbent prices 
are the 
0,
_ _ _ r tSW in both airports τ+  coefficients.  There are dummies for different periods 
around the quarter Southwest establishes dual endpoint presence on the threatened route (a time 
period we denote t0).  We include dummies for the periods seven or eight quarters before t0, five 
or six quarters before, three or four, and one or two quarters prior.  We include a separate 
dummy for t0 itself.  We also include dummies for one or two quarters after t0 and for three or 
more quarters after.  These post-t0 dummies only take a value of one if Southwest has not yet 
entered the route.  Essentially, because we include route-carrier fixed effects in the regressions, 
reported coefficients show the relative sizes of the dependent variable in the dummy period 
relative to its value in the period between two and three years (that is, the 9th through 12th 
quarters) prior to t0. 
Since Southwest typically announces service to a new airport four to six months in 
advance (in order to begin advertising, selling tickets and so on), we expect prices to start falling 
sometime before Southwest starts operating in both the endpoint airports.10  What matters is not 
the precise moment Southwest actually begins operating in the second endpoint, but when the 
incumbents realize that Southwest is more likely to enter a route in the future.  Announcing they 
are entering the second endpoint can serve the same purpose.  If true, the price due to the threat 
of entry should occur 2 to 4 quarters before t0.   
As discussed above, the conventional, static-model view of threatened entry is that 
incumbents should not respond until they actually face competition.  This notion, in the spirit of 
the classic Chicago-school critiques of predatory pricing, is based on the seemingly simple 
proposition that incumbents should not cut prices before they have to.  To do so entails losing 
                                                 
10 We examined the business press prior to several of the most recent episodes of Southwest starting operations in a 
new airport and found that Southwest typically announced its intentions four to six months ahead of commencing 
operations.  The true date that industry insiders find out the information may be even earlier, since Southwest would 
begin discussions with municipal airport authorities regarding gate leases and such (and the fact that these 
negotiations are taking place could well be observed by incumbents) prior to any public announcement. 
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profits in the short-run and has no impact on profits in the future.  This view implies that the 
coefficients on the threat of entry should be zero.   
However, three alternatives that might rationalize preemptive incumbent reactions.  They 
all have to do with dynamic effects.  They are: reducing costs in the presence of learning-by-
doing, signaling, and generating some kind of long-term customer loyalty. 
The first of these implies that when the industry technology involves learning by doing, 
an incumbent firm facing the threat of entry may want to overproduce (in the sense that it will set 
prices lower and sell more output than would be implied by the static game alone) so that in the 
future, when the potential competitor would seek to enter, it will be a lower-cost and tougher 
competitor.  While such strategic considerations may be important in other industries, we do not 
find learning-by-doing plausible here.  The incumbents in our industry have all been operating 
for decades and scale economies seem dubious. 
Second, incumbent airlines could deter Southwest’s entry by signaling that they have low 
costs on the route or are particularly committed to dominating the route, as in the spirit of, say, 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982).  Our view is that this, too, does not fit this industry well.  Through 
publicly available data sets (like the ones we use in this paper) airlines can observe a large share 
of their competitors’ total costs and demand conditions such as capital stock attributes (planes’ 
ages, fuel consumptions, and carrying capacities), labor costs, load factors, etc.  They also have 
public knowledge of labor negotiations as well as gate lease agreements signed with public 
airport authorities.  Moreover, Southwest has entered these same incumbents’ routes dozens of 
times, so one would expect they would already have a solid idea of the credibility and type of 
their rivals.  Though one can always devise a signaling model to explain the behavior we 
observe, a priori, it seems a bit of a stretch in this case.11 
A third and we think more plausible alternative is that incumbents’ fare cuts before 
Southwest enters create some longer term loyalty among their customers.  Such a mechanism 
would introduce a dynamic element to demand.  By locking in a customer base before actual 
entry occurs, the major carriers could dampen the competitive impact of Southwest’s actual entry 
if and when it does occur, similar to the idea of using long-term contracts as a barrier to entry as 
                                                 
11 More subtle theories of signaling might involve things like incumbents signaling their willingness to protect a 
threatened route because it provides important connecting services to passengers or because the route is a 
“signature” route of the carrier.  However, we do not see any way to test for these possibilities against the more 
straightforward story given the available data. 
 7
in Aghion and Bolton (1987), or when there are switching costs inherent in changing to another 
provider, as discussed in Klemperer (1987).  The airline industry even has an straightforward 
mechanism in place—frequent flyer programs—that induces just this sort of dynamic demand 
behavior, and such issues have been discussed in work such as Cairns and Galbraith (1990), 
Borenstein (1996), and Lederman (2004).  Anything that might generate long term loyalty 
through early price cutting would suffice, however. 
 
IV. Baseline Empirical Results 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating specification (1) using the average logged 
fares on incumbent carriers’ routes faced with the threat of entry by Southwest.  Column 1 
presents the baseline specification where Southwest’s actual entry is defined as occurring when it 
starts direct flights between the two cities.  To document that the prices are not arising from 
indirect competition from Southwest connecting flights, column 2 classifies Southwest entry into 
a route as either when it starts direct flight service or when at least 40 passengers fly between the 
route’s endpoints via change-of-plane service.  For a one-in-ten sample, this restricts the sample 
to routes that a passenger flies on Southwest at least around once per month.12  The number of 
observations falls with change-of-plane entry definition because we look only at routes where 
Southwest establishes a presence on both sides at least one quarter before they actually start 
flying the route and with the broader definition of entry, there are more routes where Southwest 
enters immediately.   
There is a clear and statistically significant drop in prices at just the time the incumbent 
learns that the threat of Southwest entry has increased.  In the period well before, prices show no 
significant trend.  The coefficients on the periods 5 to 6 quarters before and 7 to 8 quarters before 
Southwest establishes dual presence show no significant difference from the baseline period 
preceding them (recall that the coefficients show the value of average logged fares relative to the 
excluded period, i.e., the 9th through 12th quarters before Southwest establishes a dual endpoint 
presence).  Then, as Southwest’s entry into the second endpoint airport gets closer, prices begin 
                                                 
12 We check results using this broader entry definition because passengers could theoretically use connecting flights 
from the newly-entered endpoint airport to fly Southwest between city pairs even if direct flights are unavailable.    
We impose the 40-passenger-per-quarter threshold for the indirect-flights to count as entry in order to avoid 
counting weather diversions and things of that nature as entry as well as to exclude routes where connections are 
available but so inconvenient as to be rarely used.  The estimates were basically identical having a threshold of zero 
or having a larger threshold. 
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to fall rapidly.  By 3 to 4 quarters before operating both endpoints of a route, incumbents’ fares 
have fallen almost 11 percent (and significantly).  1 to 2 quarters prior, they have fallen 15 
percent.  By the time Southwest actually starts operating on both sides of the route, prices are 
almost 19 percent lower.  The longer the delay before Southwest actually starts operations on the 
route, the more prices continue to fall.13  As discussed above, the fact that prices begin to fall 
before t0 is not surprising given the fact that Southwest announces airport operations and starts 
selling tickets at least two quarters before airport entry and the industry insiders are likely to find 
out the news some time before that. 14 
 Once Southwest actually enters in te, prices again fall, as seen in the SW_flying_route 
coefficients.  Prices upon entry are immediately some 26 percent lower than in the baseline 
period and 32 percent lower after the third quarter following entry.  Note, though, that these are 
not 26 and 32 percent drops at the time of actual entry, since prices are already down 18 percent 
or more from the threat of entry.15  Notice too that while these post-entry coefficients are 
presented after all of the threatened entry coefficients, the time difference between t0 and te varies 
across routes: Southwest actually enters some threatened routes one quarter after t0, others 
several quarters after, and still others it does not enter at all (at least by the end of our sample). 
 The results for the alternate definition of Southwest entry (when either Southwest starts 
flying directly or enough passengers are using connecting flights to travel between the two 
endpoint cities) are very similar and in fact statistically indistinguishable.  Again incumbents’ 
prices begin to fall significantly before Southwest actually starts flying a route.  The timing 
echoes that in the direct-flight entry case and the magnitudes are very similar.   
To ensure that our results are not being driven by our choice of the size of the event 
window or the comparison period and that the timing is correct, in Table 3A we estimate a 
                                                 
13 This could result from an increasing entry hazard: the longer Southwest waits, the more likely it is to enter the 
route in the next period.  Alternatively, it may be driven by selection issues.  If Southwest waits longer to enter 
routes where incumbents cut fares the most, this could skew the coefficients negative. 
14 We exclude the routes that Southwest enters right away since it is not clear how to interpret the results in those 
cases.  When we estimated our standard specification on these routes, the results showed that these fares also 
dropped as soon as Southwest announces it will enter the airport, though the early drops were considerably larger for 
the median fares on a route than for the mean fares. 
15 This estimated impact of Southwest entry is smaller than that estimated in some previous work such as Morrison 
(2001).  In that case, though, he estimates fare impacts using fare variation across routes rather than within a route 
across time as we do here.  Our sample is also a selected one since we are restricting things to the potential entry 
sample. 
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specification that expands the event window out to four years before t0 and breaks the timing 
dummies out quarter-by-quarter (the excluded period is therefore the 15th and 16th quarters before 
t0).  The results confirm the baseline findings.  From 16 quarters before all the way to 5 quarters 
before, there is little pattern in prices and certainly none of the coefficients is significant.  At 
exactly the period we believe the incumbents learn that Southwest is going to establish a 
presence on both sides of a route, prices begin to fall significantly.  They drop by more than 12 
percent over the three quarters.16 
 These basic results, then, suggest that incumbents are quite responsive to the threat of 
Southwest entry.  At least half—and perhaps as much as three-quarters—of the total impact of 
Southwest airlines on incumbents’ fares occurs before Southwest actually enters a route.  This 
pre-entry impact is driven by Southwest threatening entry by announcing and establishing a 
presence in the second endpoint airport on a route. 
 
V. Testing for Plausibility and Controlling for Alternatives 
A. The Number Passengers 
 The results seem to suggest that incumbents cut their prices by 15-20 percent before 
Southwest even starts flying on the threatened routes.  If the price drop is real, certainly the 
number of passengers flying on the incumbent carriers should rise.  In columns 3 and 4 of Table 
3, we estimate specification (1) using the log number of passengers as the dependent variable.  
We once again obtain estimates for both entry definitions.  The results show that at exactly the 
period where the incumbents prices begin to fall (3 to 4 quarters before Southwest starts 
operating in the two airports), the number of passengers begins to rise substantially.  Depending 
on which time period we look at (up to the establishment of dual endpoint presence), the relative 
fare and passenger quantity changes imply point estimates for the price elasticity of demand 
between -0.82 and -1.87.  We cannot rule out a somewhat broader range given the standard 
errors on the estimates but such magnitudes are certainly consistent with the 21 different studies 
of the price elasticity for air travel surveyed in Gillen et al. (2003).  They find the median 
estimate of the price elasticity is -1.1 with the 25th to 75th percentile ranging from -0.64 to -1.4.  
 In addition, the fact the significant rise in quantity that accompanies the price declines 
                                                 
16 To verify that the estimated fare drops were truly discontinuous at that point, we also estimated a specification 
that added a linear time trend from the start of the event window to Southwest’s actual entry.  The pattern was quite 
similar and still significant, though, naturally, the magnitudes were somewhat smaller. 
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further suggests that competition from the indirect entry of Southwest onto the route is unlikely 
to be the source of the price declines.  With pre-emption they are trying to increase passengers 
today to improve demand post-entry.  With competition, the demand for the incumbent should be 
falling. 
 
B. Comparisons and Cost Controls 
 In Table 4, we also consider the potential role of cost shocks as an alternative explanation 
for the results.  In particular, if Southwest chooses to enter airports that it knows will experience 
positive operating cost shocks in the near future, this will lead to a spurious correlation between 
our measure of Southwest's threat of entry and the subsequent decline in incumbents’ fares.   
 To control for such cost shocks we first, in columns 2 and 3, compare the fares on a 
threatened route to a control group of the carrier’s fares on other routes involving the same 
airports on one end but non-Southwest airports on the other (column 1 reports again the baseline 
price regression from Table 3).  We illustrate the principle behind the routes in the control 
groups in Figure 2.  In the Philadelphia-Jacksonville example, the dependent variable in column 
2 is the average logged fare on (say) US Airways’ PHL-JAX route minus the average logged 
fares on US Airways’ routes between PHL and airports to which Southwest doesn’t fly (we 
restrict alternative airports to those in the top 100 to be comparable).  We do the same in column 
3, but now for routes between JAX and non-Southwest airports.  The regressions look at what 
happens to incumbents’ prices on a threatened route relative to their prices on their other routes 
out of the same airports.  Any airport-specific operating cost shocks should expectedly be 
removed from this relative fare difference.  The coefficients here are even larger than before.  By 
the time Southwest establishes dual presence on the route, the incumbent’s prices fall 20 to 24 
percent relative to their prices on other routes out of those same airports.   
 In column 4, we go a step further and include those alternative-route prices directly in the 
regression as explanatory variables.  (The average fares on the control routes are referred to as 
the “operating cost controls” in the table.)  These controls have significant and positive 
coefficients, as one would expect.  When US Airways’ fares rise on routes between Jacksonville 
and other airports, US Airways’ fares also rise on the threatened route out of Jacksonville.  The 
estimated impact of Southwest's threat, however, is virtually unchanged with the addition of 
these cost controls.  Whereas we previously found incumbent fares down about 19 percent by the 
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time Southwest establishes airport presence on both sides of a route, here we find them down 
about 18 percent (and not significantly different from before). 
 These tests indicate that fare drops on threatened routes are not merely reflecting fare 
declines in all routes out of the endpoint airports.  Instead, the fare reductions documented in the 
baseline results seem independent of overall fare movements. 
 
C. Concentrated Routes 
 Of course, incumbent routes vary in their market structure even before Southwest 
threatens to enter.  Some are highly concentrated, while on others incumbents face a great deal of 
competition.  Previous work on the airline industry has suggested that the concentrated routes are 
places the incumbents may have market power whereas the routes with many competitors may 
be effectively competitive already.  If true, we would expect to find a larger impact of the entry 
threat from Southwest on routes with higher concentration. 
To get at this issue, we split our sample by the HHI of carriers on that particular route 
over the four quarters prior to Southwest’s entry threat.  Column 1 of Table 5 shows the 
estimates from our baseline price regression obtained using routes whose HHI is at the median or 
below.  Column 2 shows results from routes above the median.  The results show that prices only 
decline on the concentrated routes.  On low HHI routes, incumbents’ prices have fallen only 
about 2 percent by the time Southwest begins operating in the second endpoint airport, and this 
estimate is not significantly different from zero.  On the high HHI routes, on the other hand, fares 
have dropped more than 20 percent and the coefficients are very significant. 
 
D. Behavior in “Nearby” Airports 
 In some large metropolitan areas, Southwest establishes its airport presence in one of the 
area’s secondary airports.  Our results above look at incumbent responses out of the Southwest 
airport itself, but we also want to examine cases where the incumbent operates out of a “nearby” 
airport that might compete with the Southwest airport.  To do so we will look specifically at 
incumbent prices on routes flying out of LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark airports (when Southwest 
threatens entry into routes from Islip, Long Island), Miami (Southwest: Ft. Lauderdale), Reagan-
National and Washington-Dulles (Southwest: BWI), Boston (Southwest: Providence and 
Manchester) and Chicago O’Hare (Southwest: Midway).  We must exclude the Los Angeles, San 
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Francisco, Houston and Dallas markets from this regression because, during our sample period, 
Southwest operates in virtually all the airports in these metro areas or else regulation prevents 
competition.17 
 We date the entry threat from Southwest’s actions in the other airport.  So, for example, 
when Southwest starts operations in Orlando in 1994, they were operating on both endpoints of 
the Orlando-Chicago Midway route without flying the route itself.  Our previous results 
characterize incumbent prices on that route.  Here, we instead look at prices on the Orlando-
Chicago O’Hare route, even though Southwest doesn’t fly to O’Hare.  The results on prices and 
passenger volumes in the nearby airport are reported in the last two columns of Table 5. 
 Column 3 shows no evidence that incumbent prices in the nearby airports fall when 
Southwest threatens entry into a route.  Indeed, if anything, fares appear to be rising slightly.  By 
the time Southwest establishes dual presence, incumbents’ prices are about 7.5 percent higher 
than in the baseline period.  Though not significant in that case, similar-sized price increases are 
significant in some of the earlier periods.  At the very least, there is certainly no evidence that 
incumbents’ prices fall in the neighboring airport. 
 This result may at first glance be surprising.  However, one important thing to note is that 
the customer base in the nearby airport is likely changing significantly when Southwest threatens 
entry.  The previous results documented that incumbents’ fares fall substantially in the airport 
threatened by Southwest and that there is a big increase in passenger loads in those airports.  At 
least some of the added passengers are likely to have been diverted from the nearby airport, and 
these “movers” are likely to be among the more price sensitive customers.  Thus if the remaining 
customers have relatively inelastic demands, fares in the nearby airports need not fall, and indeed 
could be expected to rise. 
 Column 4 looks at the incumbents’ passenger volumes in the nearby airports.  The 
number of passengers falls in the period when Southwest threatens to enter (as we might expect 
when prices are rising slightly while fares at a competing airport in the same market are falling 
rapidly).  This decline then becomes particularly large when Southwest actually starts operating 
                                                 
17 Southwest operates in the four largest Los Angeles airports: Burbank, Orange County, Ontario, LAX.  Long 
Beach was the only neighboring airport they did not fly into and has only a tiny amount of incumbent major airline 
traffic in our sample.  In the San Francisco Bay area, Southwest operated in the Oakland, San Jose and San 
Francisco airports in most of our sample (until finally exiting from SFO in 2001).  The operate in Houston Hobby 
and Houston Intercontinental.  In Dallas, a law prevents flights from Love field to anywhere but a neighboring state 
so the competition with DFW is quite limited. 
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flights on the competing route.  It is important to note, however, that in most cases the major 
incumbents at the Southwest airport and at the nearby airport are not the same.  In Chicago, for 
example, Continental is an incumbent that mainly flies out of Chicago-Midway while United 
flies exclusively out of O’Hare.  The estimated effects do not imply that the same carrier is 
diverting passengers from its flights at one airport to its flights at another. 
 
VI. How and Why Do Incumbents Respond Early? 
 The results above document significant fare changes by incumbents in response to a 
threat of entry even before there is any outright competition from Southwest.  Less clear is what 
the incumbents are trying to accomplish by doing so.  
 
A. Capacity and Load Factor 
The first thing we consider is whether the airlines are primarily cutting prices while 
holding their fleet size fixed (pursuing the intensive margin) or whether prices are falling as the 
by-product of capacity expansion, perhaps as some form of strategic investment to deter entry.  
Unfortunately, the DB1A files used to construct our core sample are a sample of tickets, not 
flights, so they cannot speak to capacity issues like the number of flights on a route.  We can get 
that type of information, however, from the T-100 data of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation.  These data, rather than being a ticket-based sample, contain aggregate 
information at the segment-carrier-month level which we aggregate up to the route-carrier-
quarter level to match our DB1A-based data.  The data include the total number of passengers, 
the number of flights, and the total available seats on each segment.  This data source also 
provides an independent check on the passenger number results obtained above using the DB1A 
data.   
There are two problems with using the T-100 for our purposes.  The first and more minor 
one results from the T-100 being based on segments rather than flights as in the DB1A.  It does 
not count as a segment a direct flight that makes a stop without changing planes, though that 
would count as direct in the DB1A.18  Second, and more importantly, the T-100 has serious 
coverage problems when the number of passengers on a segment is small.  When we compare 
                                                 
18 A flight from Chicago O’Hare (ORD) to Washington Dulles (IAD), for example, that stops but does not involve a 
change of plane would show up as a direct flight in the DB1A but not as an ORD-IAD segment in the T-100. 
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the T-100 to our sample of 18,969 direct flight route-carrier-quarters in the DB1A, there are only 
3,464 matches in the T-100.  The main source of the problem is that whereas the DB1A has each 
route in the sample for an average of 18 quarters, the T-100 has roughly half that.  In the T-100, 
flights appear to start, stop, and start again.  Correspondingly, the match quality is much worse 
for the smallest segments.  This matching problem is clearly concentrated in the smaller routes, 
however.  The T-100 accounts for only about 20 percent of the route-carrier-quarters in the 
DB1A sample, but those 20 percent account for 95 percent of the total passengers in the DB1A.  
Since we our weighting each route in our regressions by the number of passengers, we are less 
concerned about the missing routes. 
To see this in the case of passenger loads, in column 1 of Table 6 we restrict the larger 
DB1A sample to only those route-carrier-quarters that are also in the T-100.  The results for 
passengers are similar to the full-sample DB1A results.  Next, in column 2, we report the 
corresponding estimates using the T-100’s independent measure of total passengers flown by the 
incumbents.  These show results comparable to those from the DB1A.  There is a significant 
increase in the number of passengers surrounding the threat of Southwest entry, with the 
magnitude and the timing showing marked similarities across the two data sets.  Indeed the total 
effect on passengers is slightly larger in the T-100 than in the core sample. 
We look at two measures of incumbent capacity on threatened routes in columns 3 and 4.  
Column 3 shows results for the logged number of seats available and column 4 for the logged 
number of flights.  In both cases, there are positive but insignificant coefficients; while we 
cannot rule out a rise in capacity, the evidence for it is not strong.  In column 5, we look at the 
log of the load factor (the share of available seats on the flights that had passengers in them).  
Here, we find statistically significant evidence that, regardless of whether the number of flights 
grows, significantly more people are flying per plane.  The point estimates imply that at least 50 
to 60 percent of the increase in traffic comes from higher number of passengers per plane rather 
than just expanding the number of planes. 
 
B. Frequent Flyers 
 As discussed above, frequent flyer programs are a mechanism that would provide a 
motive for the observed incumbent fare cuts upon Southwest’s entry threat (but before its actual 
entry into the route).  If incumbents can induce people to fly more in the period just before 
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Southwest’s entry, and passengers with a greater stock of miles on a particular carrier are less 
likely to try a new airline, this could serve as a type of long-term-contract-type barrier to entry.  
This also implies that incumbents get the “biggest bang for their buck” by directing the greatest 
price drops to their passengers enrolled in frequent flyer programs. 
Unfortunately we do not directly observe the preponderance of frequent flyer program 
members in specific cities or on specific routes, so our evidence will be indirect and probably 
best characterized as suggestive.  We know that business travelers are the biggest users of loyalty 
programs (and the customers most sought after by the incumbents with those programs).19  
Business travelers tend to be the higher fare customers, so if their loyalty is the driving factor for 
the incumbents’ pre-emptive responses, the price cuts should be concentrated among very 
different groups and locations than if they are simply trying to meet competition for low-end 
leisure travelers. 
Although the DB1A data has no direct information about business travelers, we can look 
at fare quantiles to see what is happening at various points in the fare distribution.  Since 
business travelers disproportionately account for high-fare tickets, we should therefore expect to 
see fares on threatened routes fall more at the high end of the distribution.20  We present results 
of estimating (1) using the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile logged fares in columns 1 through 3, 
respectively, of Table 7 (here we return to the DB1A sample).  The fares at each of these three 
quantiles fall significantly from the threat of entry, but the point estimates indicate that the 50th- 
and 75th-percentile fares fall by about 50 percent more than the 25th-percentile fares.  The 
standard errors are too large to reject equality, though, so this result is somewhat tentative.21 
As a second, more direct test, we compare fares on threatened routes that are more 
heavily populated with leisure travelers to those without.  We classify routes by leisure status 
similarly to Borenstein (1989): for each endpoint airport’s corresponding state, we compute the 
fraction of 1998 gross state product accounted for by the hotel industry.  If this fraction is above 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Alden (2004). 
20 A separate mechanism that would also present a demand-building motive for incumbents with regard to their 
business travelers is that substantial business travel takes place using tickets purchased as a result of direct 
negotiation between large employers and incumbent carriers.  A threatened incumbent may be willing to negotiate 
more generous deals (which would show up in our data as a drop in average fares) in order to hold such corporate 
business.   
21 Another caveat is that we cannot rule out the possibility that these results arise because markups are greater at the 
higher end of the distribution, and that, as with the results by route concentration above, threatened entry has a 
greater impact on high-markup fares. 
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1 percent for either endpoint of a route, we classify it a leisure-intensive route.  The others we 
classify as business-intensive.  Columns 4 and 5 present the results on fare changes for routes 
that are leisure- and business-intensive are shown in columns 4 and 5 of the table.  Fares fall 
more on business routes when Southwest threatens entry.  While the declines are significant in 
both columns, they are roughly twice as large on the business routes.  
The results presented in this section are consistent with the notion that the fare drops on 
threatened routes reflect efforts by the incumbent to build up switching costs among its frequent-
flying business customers prior to Southwest’s entry, either to deter entry altogether or to put the 
incumbent in a better ex-post competitive position should entry occur. 
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
 This paper has looked at the response of incumbent major airlines to the threat of entry by 
examining how the incumbents respond when Southwest starts operating in the airports on both 
ends of a route but before it actually starts flying that route.  The nature of Southwest’s network 
means that the likelihood of their entering such a route rises dramatically when Southwest starts 
operating in the second endpoint airport, thus generating a discrete change in incumbents’ 
expectations about the likelihood of new competition through entry.   
 The results indicate that incumbents do indeed react to the threat of Southwest’s entry 
before actual entry takes place.  Incumbents drop fares significantly in anticipation of entry.  
This is not simply due to airport-specific cost shocks because fares drop on threatened routes 
relative to incumbents’ fares on other routes from the same airports.  The fare declines are 
accompanied by a sizable increase in the number of passengers flying the incumbents’ threatened 
routes.  The fare decreases are largest for routes that are concentrated beforehand, but do not 
decrease at all for routes into neighboring airports in the same MSA (i.e., where Southwest is not 
directly threatening entry).  There is only weak evidence that the incumbents expand capacity 
(the number of available seats and flights), but there is strong evidence that load factors increase 
on those flights they have. 
 In the end, the results are consistent with a view that the incumbents are attempting to 
establish some kind of long-term loyalty on the part of their customers before those customers 
have a new carrier to choose from.  One natural source of such loyalty are frequent flyer 
programs, though there are potentially other more amorphous mechanisms like brand loyalty.  
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Consistent with the frequent flyer story, quantile regressions suggest that the incumbent 
responses to the threat of entry are greatest among the higher fares (where frequent flyers are 
more prevalent) and on more business-traveler-intensive routes. 
The findings of this paper suggest that Southwest Airlines has a powerful competitive 
effect in the U.S. passenger airline industry, and that this effect does not operate solely through 
Southwest’s head-to-head competition with major carriers.  Substantial fare reductions from 
major carriers are induced merely by the threat of competing with Southwest.  We have focused 
on the U.S. passenger airline industry in particular because it offers a good setting to empirically 
identify the causes and effects of interest, and to therefore add to the still sparse empirical 
literature on the threat of entry.  If the response of incumbents here is anything like the responses 
in other industries, the study of preemption and customer loyalty may be fruitful avenues for 
future empirical research.  
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Figure 1. Identifying a Threatened Incumbent Route 
 
 
Philadelphia, PA 
Southwest presence 
2004: Q2 
Southwest threatens entry here 
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Figure 2. Comparison Routes for PHL-JAX 
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Table 1. Probability of Southwest’s Entry into a Route 
 
Southwest operates in one endpoint airport in the previous quarter 
(single presence) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
Southwest operates in both endpoint airports in the previous quarter 
(dual presence) 
0.169 
(0.020) 
N 143,380 
 
Notes: The table shows estimates from a probit estimation for Southwest’s entry into a route in a particular quarter, 
conditional on the number of the route’s endpoint airports served by Southwest in the previous quarter.  The 
excluded category includes observations where Southwest does not serve either endpoint airport in the previous 
quarter.  Quarter fixed effects are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Fare and Passenger Summaries 
 
 Mean (std deviation) 
Direct Flights to Threatened Airport 
Avg. ln(fare) 
ln(passengers) 
 
Number of Threatened Routes 
Route-Carrier-Quarters in sample 
 
Direct Flights to Neighboring Airport  
Avg. ln(fare) 
ln(passengers) 
 
Number of Threatened Routes 
Route-Carrier-Quarters in sample 
 
5.21 (0.45) 
2.55 (2.13) 
 
678 
18,969 
 
 
5.16 (0.48) 
3.81 (2.69) 
 
169 
7,296 
  
Notes: Authors' calculations using the DB1A database from the U.S. Department of Transportation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Basic Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: ln(p)  ln(p) ln(q) ln(q) 
Entry defined by: direct flight any flight
direct 
flight any flight
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-8 to t0-7 
-.047 
(.019) 
-.037 
(.050) 
.017 
(.037) 
.042 
(.055) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-6 to t0-5 
-.044 
(.033) 
-.010 
(.039) 
.000 
(.051) 
.006 
(.059) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-4 to t0-3 
-.107 
(.037) 
-.073 
(.042) 
.129 
(.055) 
.129 
(.058) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-2 to t0-1 
-.151 
(.044) 
-.097 
(.050) 
.125 
(.085) 
.061 
(.075) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0 
-.187 
(.051) 
-.153 
(.062) 
.132 
(.087) 
.095 
(.083) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0+1 to t0+2 
-.189 
(.051) 
-.221 
(.066) 
.095 
(.086) 
.102 
(.087) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
 t0+3 to t0+12 
-.260 
(.055) 
-.300 
(.075) 
.151 
(.084) 
.192 
(.091) 
Southwest flying route 
te 
-.256 
(.055) 
-.185 
(.071) 
.118 
(.100) 
.066 
(.087) 
Southwest flying route 
te+1 to te+2 
-.271 
(.073) 
-.226 
(.070) 
.115 
(.100) 
.067 
(.099) 
Southwest flying route 
 te+3 to te+12 
-.321 
(.082) 
-.234 
(.076) 
.142 
(.115) 
.118 
(.106) 
N 18,969 15,819 18,969 15,819 
R2 .89 .84 .94 .93 
 
Notes: This table shows estimates from passenger-weighted average logged fares and logged total passengers for our 
baseline sample.  All regressions include route-carrier and quarter fixed effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are clustered by route to account for correlation across time and across carriers on the same route.  The sample 
includes all routes where Southwest threatens entry as defined in the text.  The “Southwest in both airports” 
dummies denote Southwest having flights involving airports on both ends of a route previous to actually flying the 
route.  The “Southwest flying route” dummies denote Southwest actually operating flights on the route.  Columns 
(1) and (3) define Southwest airlines as entering a route when they establish direct service between the two airports.  
Columns (2) and (4) define entry as establishing either direct or change-of-plane service, where the latter is defined 
as having in the sample at least 40 change-of-plane Southwest tickets for the route. 
  
 
Table 3A: Basic Results with Longer Event Window and Finer Time Gradation 
 
 Dependent Variable: ln(p) 
 Entry defined by: direct-flight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period incumbent 
learns of increase in  
Pr(SW Entry) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-14 
t0-13 
t0-12 
t0-11 
t0-10 
t0-9 
t0-8 
t0-7 
t0-6 
t0-5 
t0-4 
t0-3 
t0-2 
t0-1 
t0 
t0+1 
t0+2 
t0+3 to t0+12 
 
Southwest flying route 
te 
te+1 to te+2 
te+3 to te+12 
 
 
 
-.005 (.022) 
-.023 (.031) 
-.052 (.033) 
-.015 (.033) 
.016 (.034) 
.006 (.037) 
-.040 (.036) 
-.070 (.042) 
-.069 (.043) 
-.039 (.047) 
-.101 (.048) 
-.132 (.051) 
-.161 (.053) 
-.155 (.058) 
-.195 (.066) 
-.195 (.066) 
-.194 (.065) 
-.264 (.072) 
 
 
-.261 (.074) 
-.275 (.095) 
-.322 (.100) 
 
 
 N 
R2 
20,645 
0.88 
 
Notes: This table shows estimates from passenger-weighted average logged fares for our baseline sample, but with 
an expanded event window (see text for details).  All regressions include route-carrier and quarter fixed effects.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for correlation across time and across 
carriers on the same route.  See also Table 3 notes for variable definitions. 
 
Table 4. Incumbent Average Fare Responses, Adjusted for Operating Cost Proxies 
 
 (1) Baseline 
(2) 
Alternates 1
(3) 
Alternates 2 
(4) 
cost controls
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-8 to t0-7 
-.047 
(.019) 
-.050 
(.040) 
-.036 
(.029) 
-.030 
(.018) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-6 to t0-5 
-.044 
(.033) 
-.076 
(.058) 
-.026 
(.041) 
-.034 
(.030) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-4 to t0-3 
-.107 
(.037) 
-.144 
(.065) 
-.093 
(.048) 
-.086 
(.035) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0-2 to t0-1 
-.151 
(.044) 
-.208 
(.079) 
-.164 
(.052) 
-.143 
(.041) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0 
-.187 
(.051) 
-.237 
(.083) 
-.201 
(.057) 
-.176 
(.049) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0+1 to t0+2 
-.189 
(.051) 
-.235 
(.085) 
-.219 
(.053) 
-.162 
(.043) 
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
 t0+3 to t0+12 
-.260 
(.055) 
-.257 
(.095) 
-.278 
(.061) 
-.222 
(.047) 
Southwest flying route 
te 
-.256 
(.055) 
-.320 
(.113) 
-.290 
(.072) 
-.236 
(.056) 
Southwest flying route 
te+1 to te+2 
-.271 
(.073) 
-.314 
(.106) 
-.333 
(.081) 
-.259 
(.056) 
Southwest flying route 
 te+3 to te+12 
-.321 
(.082) 
-.384 
(.124) 
-.378 
(.095) 
-.312 
(.063) 
Operating cost control, 
endpoint airport 1  - - 
.404 
(.059) 
Operating cost control, 
endpoint airport 2  - - 
.297 
(.064) 
N 18,969 17,239 18,498 18,146 
R2 .89 .84 .87 .91 
 
Notes: All regressions are weighted by passengers and include route-carrier and quarter fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for correlation across time and across carriers on the 
same route.  The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is the average log of fares for the route-carrier.  The 
dependent variable in column (2) is the average log price of direct flights minus the price of direct flights by the 
same carrier between endpoint airport 1 and alternative airports that Southwest does not fly to.  The dependent 
variable in column (3) is the price of direct flights on the route minus the price of direct flights by the same carrier 
between endpoint airport 2 and alternative airports that Southwest does not fly to.  The operating cost controls are 
defined as average fares for the same carrier between the stated airport and cities that Southwest Airlines does not 
fly.  See also Table 3 notes for variable definitions.  
 
Table 5. Results by Type of Route 
 
 
(1) 
ln(p)  
low HHI routes
(2) 
ln(p) 
high HHI routes
(3) 
ln(p) 
nearby airport 
(4) 
ln(q) 
nearby airport
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-8 to t0-7 
-.012 
(.036) 
-.054 
(.024) 
.017 
(.043) 
-.006 
(.050) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-6 to t0-5 
.048 
(.057) 
-.056 
(.026) 
.123 
(.054) 
-.164 
(.066) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-4 to t0-3 
.035 
(.068) 
-.122 
(.027) 
.101 
(.057) 
-.086 
(.076) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-2 to t0-1 
.031 
(.075) 
-.167 
(.036) 
.132 
(.064) 
-.200 
(.082) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0 
-.017 
(.082) 
-.202 
(.045) 
.076 
(.051) 
-.186 
(.097) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0+1 to t0+2 
-.051 
(.085) 
-.196 
(.036) 
.132 
(.052) 
-.225 
(.105) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
 t0+3 to t0+12 
-.168 
(.123) 
-.266 
(.044) 
.170 
(.076) 
-.322 
(.128) 
SW flying route 
te 
-.078 
(.117) 
-.270 
(.059) 
.176 
(.071) 
-.340 
(.137) 
SW flying route 
te+1 to te+2 
-.122 
(.107) 
-.282 
(.049) 
.159 
(.069) 
-.302 
(.133) 
SW flying route 
 te+3 to te+12 
-.151 
(.125) 
-.333 
(.052) 
.170 
(.077) 
-.342 
(.151) 
N 9498 9200 7296 7296 
R2 .86 .89 .88 .89 
 
Notes: All regressions are weighted by passengers and include route-carrier and quarter fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for correlation across time and across carriers on the 
same route.  The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is the average log of fares for the route-carrier.  The 
dependent variable in (4) is the log number of passengers.  Columns (1) and (2) divide the sample between routes 
that have HHI concentrations at or below the median in the sample and routes with HHI concentrations above the 
median.  Columns (3) and (4) look at the price and quantity responses on routes to neighboring airports that 
Southwest does not fly to but are in the same market as an airport where Southwest does operate.  See also Table 3 
notes for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Incumbent Capacity Responses: Flights, Seats, and Load Factors 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Data Source: 
(1) 
ln(q) 
DB1A 
(2) 
ln(q) 
T100 
(3) 
ln(seats) 
T100 
(4) 
ln(flights) 
T100 
(5) 
ln(load factor)
T100 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-8 to t0-7 
.014 
(.040) 
.007 
(.048) 
.009 
(.040) 
.001 
(.038) 
-.001 
(.024) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-6 to t0-5 
.026 
(.054) 
-.030 
(.070) 
-.026 
(.067) 
-.034 
(.060) 
-.002 
(.029) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-4 to t0-3 
.171 
(.058) 
.132 
(.056) 
.058 
(.059) 
.051 
(.055) 
.073 
(.030) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-2 to t0-1 
.170 
(.090) 
.143 
(.084) 
.069 
(.092) 
.056 
(.079) 
.071 
(.037) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0 
.181 
(.092) 
.242 
(.094) 
.123 
(.100) 
.106 
(.088) 
.121 
(.046) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0+1 to t0+2 
.145 
(.091) 
.195 
(.099) 
.092 
(.103) 
.074 
(.092) 
.103 
(.049) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
 t0+3 to t0+12 
.205 
(.088) 
.217 
(.093) 
.082 
(.104) 
.060 
(.095) 
.135 
(.053) 
SW flying route 
te 
.180 
(.105) 
.289 
(.117) 
.158 
(.121) 
.115 
(.110) 
.132 
(.071) 
SW flying route 
te+1 to te+2 
.181 
(.103) 
.286 
(.118 
.189 
(.125) 
.144 
(.108) 
.097 
(.063) 
SW flying route 
 te+3 to te+12 
.208 
(.122) 
.322 
(.130) 
.204 
(.134) 
.155 
(.124) 
.118 
(.071) 
N 3464 3464 3489 3489 3464 
R2 .93 .92 .93 .92 .71 
 
Notes: All regressions are weighted by passengers and include route-carrier and quarter fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for correlation across time and across carriers on the 
same route.  The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log number of passengers.  The dependent variable 
in (3) is the log of the total number of seats available on the route.  In (4) it is the log number of flights actually 
flown.  In (5) it is the share of the seats flown that are filled with passengers.  The data set for column (1) is the 
DB1A whereas the data set for columns (2)-(5) is the T-100 as explained in the text.  The sample in (1) is restricted 
to the same routes as in the T-100.  See also Table 3 notes for variable definitions. 
 
 
 Table 7. Frequent Flyers and the Fare Declines 
 
 
(1) 
ln(p) 
25th pctile
(2) 
ln(p) 
50th pctile
(3) 
ln(p) 
75th pctile 
(4) 
ln(p) 
leisure 
routes 
(5) 
ln(p) 
business 
routes 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-8 to t0-7 
-.043 
(.021) 
-.066 
(.025) 
-.048 
(.032) 
-.024 
(.022) 
-.085 
(.044) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-6 to t0-5 
-.059 
(.026) 
-.079 
(.038) 
-.011 
(.045) 
-.034 
(.021) 
-.047 
(.050) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-4 to t0-3 
-.100 
(.028) 
-.168 
(.045) 
-.151 
(.060) 
-.061 
(.025) 
-.147 
(.053) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0-2 to t0-1 
-.127 
(.034) 
-.189 
(.057) 
-.205 
(.070) 
-.092 
(.036) 
-.197 
(.061) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0 
-.157 
(.039) 
-.227 
(.064) 
-.241 
(.084) 
-.139 
(.053) 
-.235 
(.072) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
t0+1 to t0+2 
-.173 
(.044) 
-.233 
(.067) 
-.237 
(.082) 
-.142 
(.039) 
-.240 
(.069) 
SW in both airports (no flights) 
 t0+3 to t0+12 
-.220 
(.053) 
-.280 
(.075) 
-.333 
(.097) 
-.187 
(.051) 
-.335 
(.077) 
SW flying route 
te 
-.177 
(.056) 
-.263 
(.074) 
-.311 
(.091) 
-.158 
(.060) 
-.337 
(.102) 
SW flying route 
te+1 to te+2 
-.207 
(.084) 
-.299 
(.100) 
-.310 
(.110) 
-.130 
(.044) 
-.400 
(.090) 
SW flying route 
 te+3 to te+12 
-.300 
(.075) 
-.353 
(.101) 
-.323 
(.127) 
-.153 
(.049) 
-.484 
(.097) 
N 18,968 18,968 18,968 8849 10120 
R2 .81 .79 .82 .85 .91 
 
Notes: All regressions are weighted by passengers and include route-carrier and quarter fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for correlation across time and across carriers on the 
same route.  Columns (1)-(3) present quantile regressions for the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles or prices on a route.  
The dependent variable in columns (4)-(5) is the average log of fares for the route-carrier.  Columns (4) and (5) 
divide the sample according to whether or not the routes have at least one endpoint in a “leisure” destination state.  
See text for details.  See also Table 3 notes for variable definitions. 
 
 
